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This paper will evaluate cost overruns from a microeconomic perspective to 
determine their root causes.  The specific variables that will be evaluated are:  contract 
budget fluctuations, contract length, inflation, procurement budget fluctuation, research 
and development budget fluctuation, the technology readiness of the commodity, and 
industry concentration.  These variables will be evaluated twice.  The first evaluation will 
consist of a binary choice model to determine whether or not the dependent variables 
influence the likelihood of a cost overrun.  The specific form of the evaluation will take 
the form of a probit regression in which an independent variable value of zero indicates 
the contract did not overrun its initial contract budget baseline and one indicates the 
contract cost more than its initial baseline.  The second evaluation will regress the 
dependent variables against the natural logarithm of the magnitude of a cost overrun to 
determine whether or not they influence the amount a contract overruns its initial 
baseline.  This study will show that budget variability, inflation, industry consolidation 
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COST GROWTH IN WEAPONS SYSTEMS:  RE-EXAMINING THE 




Defense contracts have been a part of the military establishment since the 
Revolutionary war.  Defense contract cost overruns have most likely existed as long as 
defense contracts.  However, prior to World War II, government agencies were not held 
accountable for exceeding program estimates (Calcutt, 1993).  In contrast to this previous 
policy, Congress has required the Department of Defense (DOD) to explain virtually all 
cost overruns since the end of World War II. 
The nature of national defense makes defense contract cost overruns a concern for 
all tax-paying adults.  National defense is a public good.  As such, citizens can neither 
opt out of its protection nor is there a viable alternative means of protection.  Therefore, 
the financial costs of a defense contract cost overrun are shared by all. 
Cost overruns are the result of two possible root causes.  The first is simply the 
cost of producing the weapon system was more than anticipated.  The second possible 
explanation for cost overruns is that recently developed technology is incorporated into 
existing contracts thereby expanding the contract’s scope. 
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Hypothesis 
Traditionally, a cost variance (CV) has been defined as the difference between the 
budgeted cost of work performed (BCWP) and the actual cost of work performed 
(ACWP) (Gordon, 1996).  This CV is then compared to the current contract budget 
baseline to determine cost and schedule performance.  According to this construct, a cost 
overrun occurs when the value of the CV is negative. 
However, this is a technical definition utilized by the DOD that is overlooked by 
Congress and the American taxpayer.  A more appropriate definition of a cost overrun 
should compare the current estimate at completion (EAC) to the initial contract budget 
base (CBBI).  This result more accurately captures the cost growth of the program from 
inception to finish, rather than from an arbitrary point along the contract’s evolution. 
This study proposes a two-step method to determine the impact and magnitude of 
DOD contract cost overruns.  This process is based on the method used by Vincent 
Sipple in his 2002 thesis on engineering cost risk.  The first step is to determine the right-
hand side (RHS) variables that influence whether or not a contract will overrun its initial 
budget. The second step is to determine the RHS variables that influence the magnitude 
of a realized cost overrun.  Both steps postulate that the likelihood and magnitude of cost 
overruns are a function of inflation, the number of times a contract’s budget changes, 
changes in the DOD Procurement and Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 
(RDT&E) budgets, the concentration of the specific segment of the defense industry, the 
technological maturity of the commodity being purchased, and the length of the contract. 
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Scope and Limitations of the Study 
The data used in this study was derived from the Defense Acquisition Executive 
Summary database extract used by James Smirnoff in his 2006 study of the defense 
industry.  The database contained contracts spanning 1970 to 2002.  It included 14,004 
progress reports from the individual services covering 1,150 contracts (Smirnoff, 2006).  
The data does not provide insight as to why a contract budget baseline changed.  
Therefore the results generated by this study can not provide any insight into which of 
the two causes of cost overruns is more prevalent. 
Research Objectives 
As stated above, the goal of this study is twofold.  The first objective is to identify 
what causes a defense contract to overrun its initial budget.  The second objective of this 
study is to determine what variables influence the magnitude of a contract cost overrun.  
This study utilized a probit regression to evaluate the causes of a cost overrun while a 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was used to determine which variables influence 
the magnitude of a cost overrun. 
Thesis Overview 
The remainder of this thesis will be organized according to the traditional thesis 
five chapter format.  Chapter II will explore the existing literature to explain why the 
RHS variables were chosen to evaluate the causes and magnitudes of defense contract 
cost overruns.  Chapter III builds the model and methods used to evaluate the cost 
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overruns and magnitudes.  Chapter IV reports the models’ results.  Finally, Chapter V 
presents a conclusion and recommends follow-on research. 
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II. Literature Review 
Basis for Study 
The public good properties of defense contracts have given rise to a great amount 
of research into the nature of defense contract cost overruns.  However, the bulk of this 
research has isolated specific variables in the earned value management system rather 
than using economic principles to focus their analysis.  Despite this lack of a theoretical 
underpinning, a common theme that runs through defense acquisition literature is the 
notion that program instability leads to contract cost overruns.  Program instability can be 
caused by changing requirements, micro- and macro-budget instability, and immature 
technology. 
Recent cost analysis research has explored virtually every aspect of the earned 
value management system and acquisition reform.  Therefore, this chapter will focus on 
the effect of program instability on individual contracts and economic theory with 
specific emphasis on macroeconomic variables.  The goal is to develop the theoretical 
basis for the model of cost overruns proposed in chapter I.  The specific RHS variables 
that will be discussed are:   inflation, the number of times a contract is rebaselined, DOD 
budget instability, industry concentration, contract length, and technology readiness. 
Inflation 
The first independent variable to be explored is national inflation.  Basic 
economic theory holds that inflation and industry concentration both affect product price 
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levels.  According to the DOD in a, “… macroeconomic sense inflation is the change in 
buying power over time” (MCR, 2006).  Smirnoff, in his 2006 study, evaluated the 
effects of unexpected inflation on all DOD contracts in a given year.  He defined 
unexpected inflation as the difference between forecast inflation and what actually 
occurred.  However, his analysis determined that unexpected inflation did not influence 
cost overruns (Smirnoff, 2006). 
Rebaselines 
The second RHS variable evaluated in this analysis is the instability of individual 
contract budgets.  Contract budget instability is epitomized by the number of times a 
contract has been rebaselined.  James Gordon, in a 1996 thesis, produced what is 
probably the best example of academic research into the effect of contract instability on 
final price.  In this study, he defined a rebaseline as, “increases or decreases in the 
contract budget baseline (CBB) greater than 10% or adding up to greater than 10% of the 
CBB prior to the change” (Gordon, 1996).  Unfortunately, this definition can mask a 
significant amount of program instability if a program encounters a multitude of small 
changes that do not aggregate to a large percentage of the contract, or they aggregate to 
only one or two 10 percent changes.  Despite the rigor of his research, Gordon was 
unable to conclude that rebaselines influence the likelihood of a cost overrun (Gordon, 
1996).  These results contradicted the existing literature at the time of his study.  
However, a more precise definition of a rebaseline may have yielded different results. 
A second more recent study into the effect of rebaselines on contract cost and 
schedule was conducted by Steven Cross in 2006.  This study was primarily focused on 
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validating the quality of the data contained in the selected acquisition reports on major 
defense acquisition programs (MDAP).  A subsidiary goal of this study was to add new 
variables to recent cost research.  Two of these new variables were the number of times a 
MDAP was rebaselined and whether an MDAP was rebaselined two or more times.  
Cross concluded that the number of rebaselines for MDAP does predict schedule growth 
and two or more rebaselines predicts cost growth (Cross, 2006).  However, this study 
analyzed MDAPs as a whole and not as individual contracts.  Each MDAP is comprised 
of multiple contracts; therefore program managers can move money between the 
contracts without changing the overall program budget.  As such, analyzing changes in 
the MDAP budget may hide the effects on individual contracts. 
Finally, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the U.S. Congress 
have also been interested in the effect of program rebaselines on the final cost of 
MDAPs.  In 2005, a GAO audit determined that rebaselining MDAPs can mask the real 
per unit cost of new weapon systems.  This phenomenon occurs because the number of 
units purchased is decreased to prevent the need to increase the contract budget.  Further, 
once a program is rebaselined all earned value management information is reset and price 
and schedule increases are erased.  Therefore, cost overruns based on the original 
estimate are no longer reported (Levin, 2005). 
DOD Budgets 
Since defense is a public good, there is only a fixed amount of national treasure to 
finance the DOD. Therefore, the funding of all DOD contracts and operations is a classic 
budget constraint problem.  Axel Gautier studied a procurement environment where the 
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provider is paid before the project commences.  This situation exemplifies DOD 
acquisition programs.  He stated that a significant consequence of this practice is that the 
procurer will obtain less of the good than desired (Gautier, 2004).  Therefore, in order to 
obtain what is required in the initial contract, the procuring agency must pay more than 
originally negotiated. 
Smirnoff also explored the effects of fluctuations in the total DOD procurement 
and RDT&E budgets.  He determined that as the DOD procurement budget increases, the 
volume of cost overruns decreases, while changes in the RDT&E budget have no effect 
on the likelihood of cost overruns (Smirnoff, 2006). 
Industry Concentration 
A cornerstone of economic thought is that competition lowers price.  According 
to Michael Baye, monopolies tend to, “restrict output and charge a price above marginal 
cost” (Baye, 2003).  According to this proposition, the optimal pricing situation exists in 
a loosely concentrated market.  Therefore, as the defense industry becomes more 
concentrated, both negotiated contract price and final contract price should increase, 
thereby increasing the likelihood for a contract to exceed its CBBI. 
There are two main measures of industry consolidation that are used in the 
economic literature, the four-firm concentration ratio, otherwise known as the CR4, and 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) (Baye, 2003).  The CR4 is merely the percentage 
of industry sales comprised by the four largest producers in the industry.  The CR8, 
which is reported by the U.S. Census Bureau, is an extension of the CR4.  It is the 
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percentage of industry sales of the eight largest producers.  The HHI squares the market 
shares of all firms in an industry and then multiplies this value by10,000 (Baye, 2003). 
Judy Davis conducted an analysis of the defense industry consolidation.  One of 
the areas of her research was the impact of consolidation on cost overruns.  She stated 
that the DOD hoped to achieve more than $2B in contract cost savings as the defense 
industry consolidated in the 1980s and 1990s (Davis, 2006).  She found that despite this 
ambitious goal, the DOD cannot verify that these cost savings were achieved.  On the 
other hand, Davis concluded that the defense industry has become more concentrated 
than in the past.  Similarly, she determined that profits to the remaining defense 
contractors have increased.  Specifically, she calculated profit margins, returns on assets, 
and returns on equity have all increased by 2.0 percent, 1.5 percent, and 5.9 percent 
respectively (Davis, 2006).  Unfortunately she was unable to tie these improvements in 
financial fundamentals to the change in industry concentration. 
The increased industry concentration found by Davis leads to less competition in 
the defense marketplace.  Juan-Jose Ganuza explored the effect of decreased competition 
in the Spanish defense market.  He explored the effect of information asymmetry and 
how they relate to contract price and the likelihood of a contract cost overrun.  His 
procurement model for markets with less than perfect competition encouraged the buyer 
to provide very little product specification and to invest less than warranted in the 
product at the time of contract award (Ganuza, 2003).  This strategy requires ongoing 
negotiations to refine the product specification throughout the acquisition process.  This 
strategy virtually guarantees contract cost overruns in the highly technical defense market 
(Ganuza, 2003).  He concluded that information asymmetry is a significant component of 
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cost overruns and perfect competition leads to disclosure of all pertinent contract 
information (Ganuza, 2003). 
Technology Readiness 
Technology readiness (TR) refers to the measurement of, “maturity of a particular 
technology and the consistent comparison of maturity between different types of 
technology” (Mankins, 1995).  The Aerospace Systems Design Laboratory used TR 
levels (TRL) to classify emerging technologies and determine if an aircraft development 
project is economically viable as a function of cost per revenue mile (Mavris, 1995).  
This goal is accomplished by conducting an initial feasibility study which answers the 
basic questions of: 
• Why is the technology needed? 
• Can off the shelf technology be used? 
• What is the risk associated with the technology of the project? (Mavris, 
1995) 
 
A. Lee Battershell used this notion of technology risk to compare Boeing and the 
DOD’s views on risk for the development of the C-17.  Boeing typically approached 
technology skeptically, requiring new technology to “earn its way” on a new aircraft, 
while the DOD appeared to be preoccupied with new technology regardless of the cost 
(Battershell, 1995).  Maria Hedvall stated that engineering changes are relatively 
inexpensive early in a system’s production but become increasingly more expensive as 
production continues (Hedvall, 2004). 
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Contract Length 
TR and contract length are linked in the literature.  According to Battershell, the 
DOD approach to acquiring immature technology unnecessarily lengthens the acquisition 
process.  New DOD acquisition programs now take 11 to 21 years to complete because of 
the institutional preoccupation with new technology (Battershell, 1995).  This finding is 
corroborated by Hedvall in her study of the Swedish defense industry.  She argued that 
defense systems are composed of several components that must be synchronized to 
produce the final product.  However, each component is fabricated at a different rate; 
therefore, old technology must be incorporated into new technology.  The process of 
incorporating different technologies raised the price of the final, integrated system 
(Hedvall, 2004). 
Since the DOD acquisition model requires the government and defense 
contractors to enter into acquisition programs without full knowledge of the end product, 
ongoing contract negotiations are necessary.  Jean Tirol advocates a two-stage 
procurement model where contractor’s “buy into” a project.  In the first stage, the 
contractor subsidizes additional costs and enters into negotiations with the government to 
recoup the additional costs in the second stage (Tirol, 1986).  Hedvall agrees with the 
need for ongoing contract negotiation, although for a different reason.  She proposes 
what she calls the “Culture of Change.”  She asserted that this culture incorporates new 
technology into ongoing programs as it becomes available. (Hedvall, 2004). 
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III. Methodology 
Introduction of Model 
This study utilized a two-stage model to evaluate cost growth in DOD weapon 
systems.  The notion of using a two-step regression model to identify the drivers of cost 
and schedule growth and then quantify their impact on the magnitude of a cost or 
schedule overrun is not novel.  A series of theses at the Air Force Institute of Technology 
beginning with Sipple and culminating with Cross used this approach to determine the 
impact of specific earned value management (EVM) system variables on the growth of 
DOD acquisition programs (Cross, 2006). 
This series of theses coded individual programs or contracts as having cost or 
schedule growth (1) or not having growth (0).  These theses used a logistic regression 
(logit) to determine which variables caused cost or schedule growth.  The second step 
utilized those variables found to be statistically significant by the logit as the RHS 
variables in an ordinary least squares regression to quantify their impact on cost or 
schedule growth (Cross, 2006). 
Binary Choice Models 
The logistic regression used by Sipple is a binary choice model.  A binary choice 
model is simply a model with only two possible outcomes (Long, 1997).  Mathematically 
it is expressed by the relationship 
 ( )1Pr == ii YP  (1) 
 13
(Escudero, 2002).  According to Long, there are four potential models for phenomena in 
which two outcomes are possible:  a linear probability model (LPM)1, a binary logit, a 
binary probit, and a complementary log-log model (Long, 1997).  The last model is not 
addressed in this paper. 
Binary Logit 
Since the LPM is not an appropriate estimator for a binary choice, a nonlinear 
model is more appropriate.  A binary logit is the first nonlinear model that will be 
evaluated.  In order to derive a nonlinear model,  
 ( )xy r1Pr =   (2) 
must be transformed into a function that ranges from ( )∞∞⋅ , .  The transformation is 
accomplished by setting ∞→= βixlim1  and ⋅∞→= ⋅ βixlim0 .  The first of two 
common cumulative distribution functions that accommodate this transformation is the 
standard logistic distribution where 













=Λ   (3) 
Transforming this function into a log-likelihood equation yields the function 







'' ln1ln, βββl   (4) 
(Gordon, 2003).  This function is known as the logit. 
                                                          
1 Addressed in Appendix B. 
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Binary Probit 
The second cumulative distribution function that utilizes the limits 
∞→= βixlim1  and ⋅∞→= ⋅ βixlim0 , is the standard normal distribution, where 










1'   (5) 
(Milton, 2003).  Since the standard normal distribution is symmetric about the origin the 
log-likelihood function becomes 







'' ln1ln, βββl   (6) 
(Gordon, 2003).  This function is known as the probit. 
Binary Choice Model Selection 
The log-likelihood functions for the probit and the logit, are remarkably similar.  
Long and Escudero agree that both models yield consistent results.  According to 
Escudero, the only difference between the distributions lies in the tails.  This is because 
the coefficients of the independent variables are scaled differently (Escudero, 2003).  The 
variance of the probit is that of the standard normal distribution, or one, while the 
variance of the logit is equal to 3
2π .  As such, the logit has wider tails with 
correspondingly larger coefficients (Escudero, 2003). 
Further, both the logit and probit yield globally concave results (Gordon, 2003).  
Since the two nonlinear models are similar, “the choice between the logit and probit 
models is largely one of convenience and convention, since the results are generally 
indistinguishable” (Long, 1997).  Therefore, the probit will be utilized in this analysis. 
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Estimation of Independent Variable Impact on Overrun Magnitudes 
The second stage of this study is to estimate the impact of the independent 
variables on the magnitude of a cost overrun when one occurs.  Cost overruns can occur 
for many reasons and the range of overruns varies between a negative value, a cost 
underrun, and many times the original value of the contract.  An OLS regression is the 
simplest method to estimate the independent variables effects on overrun magnitudes 
(Marsh, 2000).  Therefore, it will be utilized to estimate the RHS variables impact on the 
magnitude of cost overruns. 
Model Revisited 
A two stage process will be used to determine if the independent variables of this 
study influence the likelihood of a contract experiencing a cost overrun and if 
encountered the magnitude of cost overrun.  The first stage will utilize a binary choice 
probit to determine if a contract will experience a cost overrun.  The second stage of this 
study will utilize an OLS to estimate the amount a contract will exceed its CBB. 
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IV. Data Reduction and Results 
Road Map 
This chapter will combine the theory explored in Chapter II with the methodology 
proposed in Chapter III to evaluate the impact of the independent variables on the 
likelihood of a cost overrun occurring and magnitude of a realized cost overrun.  The first 
portion of this chapter lists the sources of data and explains how the data was 
manipulated into a usable format while the second portion presents the results. 
Data Collection 
The data used in this study has been taken from four sources.  All contract 
execution information has been extracted from the Defense Acquisition Executive 
Summary (DAES).  The changes in DOD procurement and RDT&E budgets were culled 
from the DOD Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Green Book.  Industry concentration data was 
pulled from the US Census Bureau.  Finally, inflationary data has been interpreted from 
the Fiscal Year 2007 President’s Budget. 
Contract Information 
The DAES database contains progress reports from the individual services on all 
Acquisition Category I programs (ACAT 1) (OSD, 2006).  The services provide quarterly 
progress reports to OSD for each active ACAT I program.  The DAES database used for 
this analysis was originally used by Smirnoff his 2006 thesis.  Has database contained 
14,002 individual submissions for 1,150 contracts that were managed by the DOD 
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between 1977 and 2002 (Smirnoff, 2006).  The Smirnoff database contains a multitude of 
contract information.  However, this analysis will only utilize six of his independent 
variables.  The variables used in this analysis were:  ACWP, BCWP, budget at 
completion (BAC), CBB, submission date, and contract type. 
Since most of the progress reports in the database were interim reports, the first 
step in the analysis was to find the first and last entry for each contract.  Once this was 
accomplished the CBBI was defined as the CBB associated with the first entry for each 
contract.  This value was recorded for later use in the analysis.  The second step was to 
count the number of times the CBB was changed throughout the life of the contract.  This 
value represents the number of times the contract was rebaselined. 
A contract’s length was determined by reviewing the submission date of each 
report.  The date of the first contract entry was established as the starting point.  The 
minimum program length was set to one year.  A logical formula was then inserted into 
Microsoft Excel to compare each subsequent submission date with the preceding value.  
If the year of the more recent report was greater than the previous report, then the 
program length was increased by one year.  This method does not round to the nearest 
value, nor does it allow for fractional values, however, it is functionally easy to calculate. 
The key step in the analysis was to determine if the contract exceeded its initial 
budget.  This was done by calculating the EAC and comparing this value to the CBBI.  If 
the CBBI was greater than the EAC, the contract had not experienced a cost overrun.  If 
the CBBI was less than the EAC, the contract had overrun its initial budget.  Since the 
DAES only reports top-level data, the most basic EAC formula was used: 
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 ( )BCWPBACACWPEAC −+=   (7) 
(DAU, 2006).  The magnitude of a cost overrun or underrun was determined by taking 
the difference between the EAC and the CBBI. 
Technology Readiness 
Technology readiness was the most difficult right hand side variable to calculate 
with the available data.  The DAES database does not provide technology readiness 
levels similar to those used by NASA or the Air Force Research Laboratory.  Therefore, 
the type of contract used in the acquisition process was used to proxy the technology 
readiness of the commodity purchased.  The government utilizes cost plus contracts to 
minimize contractor risk for less well-defined technology and firm price contracts for less 
risky ventures (Sheffrin, 1976).  In this case, if the contract is a fixed price contract or 
any of the fixed price variants, it is denoted with a zero; while a cost plus contract is 
represented with a one.  This structure is chosen to yield a positive coefficient for 
technologically immature commodities. 
DOD Budgets 
All DOD budget information was extracted from the National Defense Budget 
Estimates for the Fiscal Year 2007 (FY07) Budget, more commonly referred to as the 
FY07 Green Book.  All procurement and research & development budget information is 
contained in Table 6.1 (DOD, 2006).  This table lists the change in real value, in constant 
2007 dollars, of DOD Total Obligation Authority, for all appropriation categories, as a 
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percentage from the previous year.  The appropriation categories that are pertinent in this 
































Figure 1:  Percent Change of DOD Appropriations (FY77-FY02) 
 
Industry Concentration 
All industry concentration data was taken from surveys performed by the U.S. 
Census Bureau.  The Census Bureau publishes a census of American industry every five 
years (U.S. Census, 2006).  These surveys are the Economic Census, Manufacturing 
Surveys.  An Industry Concentration Report is included in each Economic Census, 
Manufacturing Survey.  All industry concentration data was culled from the 2002, 1997, 
1992, 1987, 1982, and 1977 Industry Concentration Ratio reports. 
The U.S. Census Bureau divides industry into sectors in order to calculate 
industry concentration rations.  The U.S. Census Bureau used the North American 
Industry Classification System Codes (NAICS) to segment industry during the 1997 and 
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2002 censuses.  Prior to 1997, the Census used the Standard Industrial Classification 
System (SIC) to divide American Industry.  The Census Bureau published the 1997 
Economic Census:  Bridge Between NAIC and SIC.  This document provides a 
crosswalk to link SIC codes to their corresponding NAICS codes.  The manufacturing 
industry produces the products that the DOD is purchasing with the contracts contained 
in the DAES.  The specific NAIC and SIC codes used in this analysis are: 
Table 1:  NAIC and SIC Crosswalk 
NAIC SIC Description
33422 3663 Wireless Communications Equipement
33661 3732 Ship and Boat Building
332995 3489 Other Ordnance
334511 3812 Search, Detection, Navigation, Guidance
336411 3721 Aircraft Manufacturing
336412 3724 Aircraft Engine
336413 3728 Other Aircraft Manufacturing
336414 3761 Guided Missile/Space Manufacturing
336415 3764 Guided Missile/Space Propulsion
336419 3769 Other Guided Missile/Space
336992 3795 Military Armored Vehicles
Source:  U.S. Bureau of the Census  
The Industry Concentration Ratio reports provide the number of firms producing 
in that given segment of industry; the value of all shipments; the CR4, CR8, CR20, and 
CR50; as well as the HHI.  This analysis only studies the impact of the number of firms, 
the CR4, and the CR8.  Since the US Census Bureau only provides information once 
every five years, the data was extrapolated from one survey to the next.2 
This method of extrapolation was adequate for all but two industry segments.  
These two industry segments were the wireless communications industry and the Search, 
Detection, Navigation, and Guidance industry.  Additionally, this method was 
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problematic for the HHI as well.  The Census Bureau masks the HHI for highly 
concentrated industries to protect proprietary information.  This practice generated 
several gaps in the data for individual industry segments making analysis difficult.  
Therefore, the HHI was not used as an independent variable in the analysis.  The CR4 
was selected as the appropriate measure to represent industry concentration. 
Inflation 
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) implicit price deflator (IPD) is considered to 
be, “the single best measure of broad price movements in the economy” (DOD, 2007).  
The IPD is the ratio of “GDP in current prices to the GDP in constant prices” (DOD, 
2007).  Therefore the IPD will be used to calculate a proxy for inflation.  It is expressed 
as a chain index where the base year is equal to 1.00.  The GDP chain index was 
extracted from the FY07 Budget of the United States Government, Table 10.1.  The base 
year for the index in this table is 2000.  The growth in the GDP chain-index, over the 
period of analysis, is presented below: 
                                                                                                                                                                             



















Figure 2:  Growth in GDP (1977-2006) 
 
Inflation is calculated by dividing the most current year GDP chain index by the 
chain index of the year in question (Davis, 2006).  For example, inflation for the year 
1977 was found to be 2.71 percent.  This value was found by dividing the 2006 chain 
index value of 1.1475 by 0.4233, the 1977 chain index.  Inflation, over the period of 




















Figure 3:  Inflation (1977-2006) 
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Results 
The RHS variables discussed throughout this paper will be evaluated twice.  The 
first evaluation will look at their influence on the likelihood of a cost overrun occurring, 
while the second evaluation will determine their impact on the magnitude of a realized 
cost overrun. 
Summary Statistics 
The summary statistics for the data used in this analysis are: 
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Table 2:  Summary Statistics 
Variable obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Overrun 1150 0.7095652 0.4541605 0 1
Magnitude 1150 102.1169 603.7141 -1493.6 10673.7
ln(Magnitude Cost Overrun) 818 3.283981 1.860017 -2.302585 9.275538
ln(Percent Cost Overrun) 1149 0.7274253 4.663351 -0.6804309 143.5
GDP Deflator 1150 1.522135 0.3603345 1.1 2.7108
Change Procurement  Budget 1150 -0.4854783 11.31916 -19.9 24.5
Change RDT&E Budget 1150 3.278869 7.373217 -10.2 14.9
CR4 1150 61.41043 19.62887 11 96
Number Rebaselines 1150 6.733043 6.55399 0 39
Contract Length 1150 3.641739 2.049092 0 14
Technology Readiness 1150 0.4052174 0.4911477 0 1  
The data indicates that nearly 71 percent of the DOD contracts encountered cost overruns 
with an average amount of $102 million.  However, this number is influenced by four 
contracts for the C-17, A-12 and Trident submarine that accounted for nearly $9.7B.  All 
contracts averaged 3.6 years with nearly seven rebaselines each.  Further, inflation 
averaged 1.5 percent annually, with an average CR4 of 61 percent.  Finally, 40 percent 
were fixed price contracts while 60 percent were cost-plus contracts. 
Binary Choice 
The model utilized to explore the likelihood of a cost overrun occurring is a probit 
where: 
 ( )4,,,#,&,,)Pr( CRTRLengthangesBaselineChDRPcmtGDPfCO ∆∆=   (8) 
In this case GDP is equal to the inflation derived from the GDP IPD, ∆Pcmt is the annual 
percent change in the DOD Procurement budget, ∆R&D is the annual percent change in 
the RDT&E budget, #BaselineChanges is the number of times the CBB has changed, 
Length is the length of contract, TR is the technology readiness proxy, and CR4 is the 
industry CR4 for a given contract. 
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The probit model3 yielded the following results when reporting the change in 
probability: 
Table 3:  Probit Model Results 
Variable dF/dx P(Z)
GDP Deflator 0.0621359 0.149
Change in Procurement 0.0011605 0.485
Change in R&D 0.0006480 0.782
CR4 0.0001576 0.825
Number Rebaselines*** 0.0201413 0.000
Contract Length*** 0.0371733 0.002
Technology Readiness 0.0356250 0.196
Obs P. 0.7095652




*** Significant to the 1% level
** Significant to the 5% level
* Significant to the 10% level  
The marginal effects value, or DF/dx, represents the discrete change of the dependent 
variable from a zero to one.  In this case the discrete change occurs when a contract 
overruns its CBBI.  The pseudo-R2 of .1117 indicates that contract management is a 
volatile process and the likelihood of a contact experiencing a cost overrun is highly 
stochastic.  Despite the fact that nearly 89 percent of the causes of a cost overrun are not 
explained by this model the high p-score indicates that the model has tremendous 
statistical significance.  
Only two of the independent variables used to analyze the occurrence of cost 
overruns proved to be statistically significant.  These two variables were the number of 
rebaselines and the length of the contract.  However, both variables were statistically 
                                                          
3 The probit is presented here as it is consistent with the models used in similar studies in the economic 
literature.  Since the logit model is more commonly found it cost research it is presented along with a linear 
probability model in Appendix B.  All three models yielded similar results. 
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significant to the one percent level, indicating a very powerful positive influence on the 
likelihood of an overrun occurring.  As such, contract budget instability and extending 
the length of a contract both add to the likelihood of a contract experiencing a cost 
overrun.  Each time a contract is rebaselined it is two percent more likely to experience a 
cost overrun while an additional year in program length adds 3.6 percent to the likelihood 
of a cost overrun.  The remaining variables had no influence on the likelihood of a 
contract overrunning its CBBI.4 
A Hausman test was performed to determine if there are endogenous variables in 
the model.  The Hausman test concluded that none of the RHS variables were 
endogenous.5  Therefore, contract budget instability and contract length are accurate 
predictors of cost overruns. 
Impact on Magnitude 
The left-hand side variable used in OLS regression was the magnitude of the cost 
overrun.  This number calculated by taking the difference between the most recent EAC 
and the CBBI.  The specific model used was: 
( )CBBITRLengthangesBaselineChInitialCRDRPcmtGDPfnitudeOverrunMag ,,,#,4,&,, ∆∆∆=
(9) 
The RHS variables used in this model are largely the same as the variables used in the 
probit model.  The CBBI was added to help scale the magnitude while the change in GDP 
IPD was used to measure the effects of inflation over the life of the contract.  The CR4 
                                                          
4 The model proved highly insensitive to the measure selected to represent industry concentration.  All 
regressions provided very similar results.  Additional models utilizing alternate measures of industry 
concentration are contained in Appendix C. 
5 Post estimation results are included in Appendix B. 
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encountered when the contract was signed was used to measure industry concentration 
with regard to the initial contract price.  The regression results are: 
Table 4:  OLS Model Results 
Variable Coefficient P(t)
Change in GDP Deflator 147.145700 0.2600
Change in Procurement 0.267741 0.9010
Change in R&D 2.460645 0.4200
Initial CR4** 2.281388 0.0180
Number Rebaselines*** 27.198500 0.0000
Contract Length** 43.802330 0.0040










*** Significant to 1% level
** Significant to 5% level
Bruesch-Pagan Het Test
Ramsey Omitted Variable Test
6 
 
The adjusted r-squared value indicates that this model explains nearly 16% of the factors 
that influence the amount a contract over run its initial budget while the p-score indicates 
that the model is very significant.  In conjunction with the high p-score, five of the nine 
RHS variables are statistically significant when considering how much a contract will 
exceed its CBBI. 
The number of rebaselines, and intercept are significant to the one percent level 
while the initial CR4, CBBI, and contract length are significant to the five percent level.  
                                                          
6 A second OLS regression in which the cost overrun magnitude is a function of change in the GPD IPD, 
change in procurement budget, change in R&D budget, change in CR4, number of rebaselines, contract 
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Consequently, as the CR4 increases by one percent the magnitude of a cost overrun will 
increase by $2.3M.  Likewise the magnitude of an overrun will be increased by $27.2M 
for each rebaseline and $43.8M for each additional year.  The CBBI while statistically 
significant has a very small impact on the amount of a cost overrun, although it does 
indicate that larger contracts will experience more cost overruns.  The variables that were 
not statistically significant to the impact the magnitude of a cost overrun were the change 
in the GDP IPD, changes in the procurement and RDT&E budgets, and the type of 
contractual vehicle used. 
Summary 
The probit model presented in this chapter provides significant insight into the 
economic factors that influence the likelihood of a contract experiencing a cost overrun.  
It indicates that rebaselines and contract length are prime indicators that a contract will 
overrun its CBBI.  Additionally, the OLS model indicates that the number of times a 
contract is rebaselined, contract length, and initial CR4 have a significant impact on the 
magnitude of a cost overrun. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
length, technology readiness, and CBBI yielded similar coefficients and magnitudes with a adjusted r-
squared of 0.1521.  The rebaseline coefficient was 25.5 and the contract length coefficient was 41.2. 
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V. Implications and Conclusion 
Results Revisited 
The goal of this research was to analyze DOD contracts to determine if 
fluctuating contract budgets and macroeconomic variables influence the likelihood of a 
cost overrun for DOD acquisition contracts, and if so by how much.  The analysis utilized 
a two-step process to determine if the likelihood and magnitude of cost overruns as a 
function of inflation, the number of contract rebaselines, change in procurement budget, 
change in RDT&E budget, CR4, contract length, and TR of the purchased commodity.  
The analysis concluded that the likelihood of a cost overrun is influenced by both the 
number of times the contract is rebaselined and the program length.  Each time an 
acquisition contract is rebaselined the likelihood of a cost overrun occurring increased by 
two percent.  Further, each year a contract is delayed the likelihood of a cost overrun is 
increased by 3.6 percent.   
The analysis also determined that the magnitude of a cost overrun is influenced by 
the number of rebaselines, initial CR4, contract length, and CBBI of the commodity.  
There were an average of 44 active contracts each year between 1977 and 2002 and 71% 
of these contracts final costs exceeded their CBBI.  This translated into nearly $850M in 
cost overruns a year if each contract experienced a rebaseline, or $183M per contract 
since the average contract was rebaselined 6.7 times.  Further, extending all active 
contracts an extra year adds $1.4B to annual procurement costs.  Finally, as the defense 
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industry becomes more concentrated the annual cost for all contracts is an additional 
$71M for each percentage point rise in the CR4. 
Policy Implications 
The implications of these results to the DOD are relatively straightforward.  A 
major culture change should be encouraged inside the DOD.  The DOD should not 
attempt to evolve contracts as new technology becomes available.  This practice 
unnecessarily lengthens acquisition programs and drives up costs and encourages budget 
instability for individual contracts.  Program managers should be encouraged to keep 
acquisition programs short and resist the temptation to buy the most technologically 
advanced systems possible.  Technology should be incorporated into existing weapons 
systems via small upgrades utilizing the spiral acquisition model.  This practice will 
make the goals of acquisition programs more realistic and curb the ever lengthening life 
span of DOD acquisition programs. 
A second major implication of this study is to the defense marketplace.  The 
defense industry consolidation that has been encouraged over the past two decades 
should be halted and reversed.  Although significant barriers exist to entry in the defense 
industry as a prime contractor, this analysis was not limited to primes.  The DOD should 
encourage more competition in the subcontractor arena which should in turn lead to more 
prime contractors in the future.  The combination of these two proposals, constraining the 
technology procurement of ongoing acquisition programs and halting the defense 
industry consolidation should reduce acquisition costs by several million dollars for each 
major acquisition program. 
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Suggestions for Further Research 
This research can be extended in several ways.  Probably the most useful 
extension would be to determine what proportion of contract cost overruns are caused by 
changing requirements and the proportion generated by poor cost estimates.  A second 
way to extend this research would be to apply this model to the individual services and 
different types of systems procured by the DOD.  Finally, the technology readiness proxy 
utilized by this study is very rudimentary.  Enhancing the technology readiness level 
proxy may provide more powerful insight into the causes of contract cost overruns. 
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Appendix A:  NAIC and SIC Information 
This Appendix lists the industry concentration information extracted from the US 
Census Bureau’s Survey of Industry, Industry Concentration Report.  Each table contains 
the extrapolated data for a single NAIC/SIC segment of the manufacturing industry. 
Table 5:  33422 Wireless Communications Equipment 
 
Year # Firms CR4 CR8 HHI
2002 934 44 55 584
2001 966 45 56 661
2000 999 46 57 739
1999 1031 47 58 817
1998 1064 48 58 894
1997 1096 49 59 972
1996 1049 47 58 927
1995 1002 46 57 883
1994 955 44 55 838
1993 908 43 54 794
1992 861 41 53 749
1991 803 40 53 700
1990 745 39 54 650
1989 688 39 54 601
1988 630 38 55 551
1987 572 37 55 502
1986 572 37 55 502
1985 572 37 55 502
1984 572 37 55 502
1983 572 37 55 502
1982 572 37 55 502
1981 572 37 55 502
1980 572 37 55 502
1979 572 37 55 502
1978 572 37 55 502
1977 572 37 55 502  
 
The SIC code for the wireless communications industry was established with the 1987 
industry census. 
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Table 6:  33611 Ship and Boat Building 
 
:
Year # Firms CR4 CR8 HHI
2002 1649 51 56 884
2001 1645 48 55 797
2000 1641 46 54 710
1999 1638 43 53 623
1998 1634 41 52 536
1997 1630 38 51 450
1996 1779 37 48 436
1995 1928 36 46 423
1994 2078 35 43 410
1993 2227 33 41 396
1992 2376 32 38 383
1991 2322 32 39 416
1990 2269 32 39 449
1989 2215 33 40 482
1988 2162 33 40 515
1987 2108 33 41 548
1986 2053 29 37 457
1985 1998 25 33 365
1984 1944 22 30 274
1983 1889 18 26 182
1982 1834 14 22 91
1981 1897 13 21 73
1980 1960 13 21 55
1979 2022 12 20 36
1978 2085 12 20 18
1977 2148 11 19 0  
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Table 7:  332995 Other Ordnance 
 
Year # Firms CR4 CR8 HHI
2002 58 78 90 2994
2001 59 79 90 2811
2000 61 79 90 2628
1999 62 80 90 2445
1998 64 81 89 2262
1997 65 82 89 2080
1996 66 82 89 2050
1995 67 82 89 2019
1994 69 83 89 1989
1993 70 83 89 1959
1992 71 83 89 1929
1991 69 82 89 1915
1990 66 81 89 1901
1989 64 79 90 1886
1988 61 78 90 1872
1987 59 77 90 1858
1986 60 73 88 1699
1985 61 70 87 1539
1984 63 66 85 1380
1983 64 63 84 1220
1982 65 59 82 1061
1981 70 57 80 849
1980 75 55 78 637
1979 79 52 76 424
1978 84 50 74 212
1977 89 48 72 0  
 35
 
Table 8:  334511 Search, Detection, Navigation, Guidance 
 
Year # Firms CR4 CR8 HHI
2002 504 59 77 1196
2001 519 59 77 1203
2000 534 59 77 1211
1999 549 59 77 1219
1998 564 59 77 1227
1997 579 59 77 1235
1996 590 53 71 1065
1995 601 46 65 895
1994 613 40 60 725
1993 624 33 54 555
1992 635 27 48 385
1991 692 27 48 388
1990 748 28 48 391
1989 805 28 49 395
1988 861 29 49 398
1987 918 29 49 401
1986 918 29 49 401
1985 918 29 49 401
1984 918 29 49 401
1983 918 29 49 401
1982 918 29 49 401
1981 918 29 49 401
1980 918 29 49 401
1979 918 29 49 401
1978 918 29 49 401
1977 918 29 49 401  
The SIC code for the search, detection, navigation and guidance industry was established 




Table 9:  336411 Aircraft Manufacturing 
 
Year # Firms CR4 CR8 HHI
2002 184 81 94 2948
2001 182 81 94 2863
2000 179 81 94 2779
1999 177 81 94 2695
1998 174 81 94 2610
1997 172 81 95 2526
1996 168 81 94 2564
1995 164 80 94 2603
1994 159 80 94 2641
1993 155 79 93 2679
1992 151 79 93 2717
1991 148 78 93 2547
1990 145 76 93 2377
1989 143 75 92 2208
1988 140 73 92 2038
1987 137 72 92 1868
1986 137 70 90 1766
1985 138 69 88 1664
1984 138 67 85 1562
1983 139 66 83 1460
1982 139 64 81 1358
1981 141 63 81 1086
1980 144 62 81 815
1979 146 61 81 543
1978 149 60 81 272
1977 151 59 81 0  
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Table 10:  336412 Aircraft Engine 
 
Year # Firms CR4 CR8 HHI
2002 296 77 82 2102
2001 293 76 82 2033
2000 290 76 81 1963
1999 287 75 81 1893
1998 284 75 80 1823
1997 281 74 80 1754
1996 293 75 81 1879
1995 305 75 82 2003
1994 316 76 82 2128
1993 328 76 83 2253
1992 340 77 84 2378
1991 346 77 84 2343
1990 353 77 84 2307
1989 359 77 83 2272
1988 366 77 83 2236
1987 372 77 83 2201
1986 354 76 83 2116
1985 336 75 83 2032
1984 317 74 83 1947
1983 299 73 83 1863
1982 281 72 83 1778
1981 270 72 84 1422
1980 259 73 84 1067
1979 248 73 85 711
1978 237 74 85 356
1977 226 74 86 0  
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Table 11:  336413 Other Aircraft Manufacturing 
 
Year # Firms CR4 CR8 HHI
2002 760 54 69 950
2001 818 54 69 985
2000 876 54 69 1020
1999 933 55 69 1056
1998 991 55 69 1091
1997 1049 55 69 1126
1996 1045 53 67 1055
1995 1041 51 66 985
1994 1036 48 65 914
1993 1032 46 63 843
1992 1028 44 62 772
1991 1007 44 61 748
1990 987 43 60 724
1989 966 43 59 700
1988 946 42 58 676
1987 925 42 57 652
1986 922 41 56 641
1985 920 40 56 630
1984 917 40 55 620
1983 915 39 55 609
1982 912 38 54 598
1981 866 39 54 478
1980 820 41 55 359
1979 773 42 55 239
1978 727 44 56 120
1977 681 45 56 0  
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Table 12:  336414 Guided Missile/Space Manufacturing 
 
Year # Firms CR4 CR8 HHI
2002 13 96.0 99.0 D
2001 13 95.1 99.1 D
2000 14 94.2 99.2 D
1999 14 93.4 99.4 D
1998 15 92.5 99.5 D
1997 15 91.6 99.6 D
1996 17 87 98 D
1995 19 83 97 D
1994 20 79 96 D
1993 22 75 94 D
1992 24 71 93 1570
1991 23 68 93 1500
1990 22 66 93 1430
1989 21 63 92 1360
1988 20 61 92 1290
1987 19 58 92 1220
1986 18 61 93 1292
1985 18 63 94 1363
1984 17 66 94 1435
1983 17 68 95 1506
1982 16 71 96 1578
1981 17 70 96 1262
1980 18 68 95 947
1979 18 67 95 631
1978 19 65 94 316
1977 20 64 94 0  
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Table 13:  336415 Guided Missile/Space Propulsion 
 
Year # Firms CR4 CR8 HHI
2002 16 90 99 D
2001 17 88 99 D
2000 17 86 98 D
1999 18 83 98 D
1998 18 81 98 D
1997 19 79 97 2056
1996 21 77 96 1934
1995 23 76 95 1812
1994 24 74 94 1690
1993 26 73 93 1568
1992 28 71 92 1446
1991 28 71 93 1471
1990 28 72 94 1496
1989 27 72 95 1520
1988 27 73 96 1545
1987 27 73 97 1570
1986 26 72 96 1536
1985 24 71 95 1503
1984 23 70 95 1469
1983 21 69 94 1436
1982 20 68 93 1402
1981 20 68 93 1122
1980 19 68 93 841
1979 19 69 93 561
1978 18 69 93 280
1977 18 69 93 0  
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Table 14:  336419 Other Guided Missile/Space 
 
Year # Firms CR4 CR8 HHI
2002 51 60 75 2515
2001 50 63 77 2478
2000 50 65 79 2440
1999 49 67 81 2403
1998 49 69 84 2365
1997 48 72 86 2327
1996 49 72 86 2269
1995 50 73 86 2210
1994 52 74 86 2151
1993 53 74 86 2093
1992 54 75 86 2034
1991 55 72 84 1897
1990 57 70 83 1760
1989 58 67 81 1624
1988 60 65 80 1487
1987 61 62 78 1350
1986 58 50 62 1080
1985 55 37 47 810
1984 51 25 31 540
1983 48 12 16 270
1982 45 0 0 0
1981 44 15 17 0
1980 43 30 34 0
1979 43 46 52 0
1978 42 61 69 0
1977 41 76 86 0  
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Table 15:  336992 Military Armored Vehicles 
 
Year # Firms CR4 CR8 HHI
2002 31 88 93 D
2001 32 88 93 D
2000 33 87 93 D
1999 35 87 93 D
1998 36 87 93 D
1997 37 86 93 D
1996 37 86 93 D
1995 37 87 93 D
1994 37 87 93 D
1993 37 88 94 D
1992 37 88 94 2320
1991 40 89 94 1856
1990 42 90 94 1392
1989 45 90 95 928
1988 47 91 95 464
1987 50 92 95 0
1986 48 91 93 503
1985 45 89 91 1006
1984 43 88 89 1509
1983 40 86 87 2012
1982 38 85 85 2515
1981 34 85 87 2012
1980 31 86 90 1509
1979 27 86 92 1006
1978 24 87 95 503
1977 20 87 97 0  
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Appendix B:  Probit Post Estimation Results and Alternate Models 
This appendix presents the Hausman test post estimation results and additional 
models with utilizing the CR4 as to measure industry concentration.  The first model 
presented is the initial probit model contained in Chapter IV, including residuals as an 
independent variable.  The results indicate that the only variable that is statistically 
significant is the residual variable.  This model is then compared to the initial model via 
the Hausman test.  The Hausman test revealed that the initial model provided efficient 
coefficient estimators while the second model with residuals does not provide efficient 
estimators.  This indicates that endogeneity is not contained in the model. 
Table 16:  Probit with Residuals 
Variable dF/dx P(Z)
GDP Deflator 0.0141148 0.783
Change in Procurement 0.0001945 0.912
Change in R&D 0.0002687 0.910
CR4 0.0000218 0.976
Number Rebaselines 0.0089044 0.229
Contract Length 0.0094943 0.632
Technology Readiness 0.0118328 0.703
Residuals* 0.7124867 0.075
Obs P. 0.7095652




Observations 1150  
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Table 17:  Hausman Results 
b (Before) B (after) b-B sqrt(diag(v_b-v_B))
GDP Deflator 0.1939282 0.0435259 0.1504023 -
Change in Procurement 0.0036219 0.0005998 0.0030221 -
Change in R&D 0.0020226 0.0008286 0.001194 -
CR4 0.000492 0.0000671 0.0004249 -
Number Rebaselines 0.0628618 0.0274585 0.0354033 -
Program Length 0.1160192 0.0292778 0.0867414 -
Technology Readiness 0.1120096 0.0365718 0.0754378 -
Coefficients
 
The next two models present alternate methods to estimate the likelihood of a cost 
overrun occurring on a DOD procurement contract.  The first competing model is the 
logit while the second is a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. 
Table 18:  Logit Model 
Variable Odds Ratio P(Z)
GDP Deflator 1.3335890 0.190
Change in Procurement 1.0058870 0.500
Change in R&D 1.0015870 0.897
CR4 0.9999807 0.856
Number Rebaselines*** 1.1275950 0.000
Contract Length*** 1.1994520 0.005





Number Covariate Patterns 996
Pearson Chi2 (988) 1030.08
P(Chi) 0.1714
Pearson Goodness of Fit
 
A LPM is merely an OLS regression to fit binary choice phenomena.  As such, 
the LPM provides the worst results of the three models that will be evaluated.  It does this 
because the observed phenomena produce an S-shaped curve that relates the probability 
of an event occurring to the studied independent variables, yet it linear relationship is 
produced (Long, 1997). 
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This linear relationship is problematic for several reasons.  The first is that the 
data is heteroskedastic.  The S-shaped nature of the curve indicates that the data does not 
have a constant variance, therefore a key assumption of the OLS is violated and the 
resulting coefficients are inefficient estimators of probability (Long, 1997).  The second 
assumption violated when a LPM is used to estimate a binary choice model is that of 
normality of the error terms.  The error terms must result from either 
 ( )ixyE−= 11ε   (13) 
or 
 ( )ixyE−= 00ε . (14) 
Hence, the error terms can not be normally distributed. Although normally distributed 
error terms are preferred, they are not required (Long, 1997). 
Finally, a LPM can produce results that simply do not make sense.  In this 
construct the expected value of y given a vector of independent variables is 
 ( ) ( )xyxyE rr 1Pr ==   (15) 
(Long, 1997).  Since a binary choice model is bounded (0,1), and it is possible for 
a LPM to yield a result outside this range, the LPM can produce results that do not fit the 
underlying data (Gordon, 2003). 
The LPM yields an inefficient estimator of ( )1Pr =iY  in binary response 
situations.  It is inefficient for the reasons stated above:  it does not have a common 
variance and it yields answers outside the possible range.  Despite these shortcomings, it 
can provide a rough estimate before more rigorous analysis is conducted. 
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Table 19:  OLS Model 
Variable Coefficient P(t)
GDP Deflator 0.059648 0.146
Change in Procurement 0.001278 0.415
Change in R&D 0.000085 0.969
CR4 -0.000064 0.925
Number Rebaselines*** 0.013196 0.000
Contract Length*** 0.034892 0.001










Ramsey Omitted Variable Test
 
The results of these two models are consistent with the probit presented in the main text.  
All three models yield the same significant variables and very similar pseudo- and 
adjusted r-squared results.  This indicates the model is highly insensitive to functional 
form.  Further, the OLS model passed the Bruesch-Pagan heteroskedasticity test and the 
Ramsey Omitted Variable test at the one percent level. 
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Appendix C: Alternate Measures of Industry Concentration 
This appendix presents the two additional probit models that utilize alternate 
measures of industry concentration to determine the likelihood of a cost overrun 
occurring.  The first model utilizes the number of firms in a given segment of the defense 
industry while the second utilizes the CR8. 
Table 20:  Probit (Firms) 
Variable dF/dx P(Z)
GDP Deflator 0.0589753 0.165
Change in Procurement 0.0011540 0.486
Change in R&D 0.0006637 0.776
Firms -0.0000076 0.701
Number Rebaselines*** 0.0203382 0.000
Program Length*** 0.0367790 0.003
Technology Readiness 0.0349616 0.205
Obs P. 0.7095652




Observations 1150  
Table 21:  Probit (CR8) 
Variable dF/dx P(Z)
GDP Deflator 0.0602118 0.155
Change in Procurement 0.0012157 0.462
Change in R&D 0.0006712 0.774
CR8 -0.0000634 0.922
Number Rebaselines*** 0.0199631 0.000
Program Length*** 0.0374885 0.002
Technology Readiness 0.0364329 0.186
Obs P. 0.7095652




Observations 1150  
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These results are consistent with the probit presented in Chapter IV.  The same variables 
are significant to the one percent level.  The only difference is the sign for the measure of 
industry concentration has flipped from positive to negative.  However, the statistical 
significance on both models is low enough to make this result insignificant.  Therefore, 
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